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STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This an appeal from a decision of the Third Dictrict Court
against the Defendant-Appellant on Plaintiff-Respondent's Declaratory Judgment Action seeking to rescind a apartment Dweller's
Insurance Policy based on material misrepresentations provided in
the preparation of the application.

The Court dismissed the

Appellant's counterclaim.
DIPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
At a non-jury trial in Third District Court for Salt Lake
County, Judge James S. Sawaya granted a Declaratory Judgment in
favor of Plaintiff-Respondent and against Defendant-Appellant,
thereby voiding an insurance policy issued to the appellant on
the ground of material misrepresentations in the application for
said policy.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Lower Court's decision,
ordering the lower court to rule that the Plaintiff-Respondent
did not meet the burden of proof as a matter of law, or, in the
alternative, granting a new trial to have the proper standard
applied in determining "material misrepresentation"•
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FACTS
On October 6, 197;, The appellant applied for Insurance with
the Respondent Company by providing information to Lloyd D.
Ferguson, an agent for the Respondent, (Exhibit P-1).

The

coverage was to cover Appellant's property at an apartment
located at 938 East Third South,

Salt Lake City, Utah.

In the

process of filling the application, several mistakes were made
either through oversight of one or both the agent and the
appellant or through deliberate omissions.
The agent admits to mistakes in writing the effective date of
the policy and duration (T-53), the length of anticipated vacancy
each year (T-57), the coverage for additional living expenses (T·
58), and on the appellant's name (T-72).
The crucial issues, however, were in conflict.

The

Respondent sought to prove that the Appellant had intentionally
withheld information required regarding prior insurance history
and prior losses, (Exhibit 1, lines 8A and 8B),
On October 2, 1975, the Appelant had been covered by a binder
of homeowner's policy with Aetna Insurance Company by their
Agent, Ed D. Smith and Sons Insurance (T-28, Exhibit P-5) and a
second binder for a "valuable items policy" was prepared on the
Appellant's behalf on October 7, 1975, (T-32, Exhibit P-5).

On

October 9, 1975, the appellant filed a claim for a loss due to a
burglary at the covered premises in an amount of approxiamtely
$8,600.0 (T-17, Exhibit P-5) and was paid a compromised amount.
-

2 -
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(Exhibit P-5 , T-157).

On about October 17, 1975,

celled his policy in a rather vague fashion.

Aetna can-

(Exhibit P-5).

The

adjuster for Aetna didn't know why, at the time of Depositions in
this case (T-144) and Linda Messerly, the only Aetna witness who
testified at the trial didn't know the basis for the cancellation
(T-35, 36, 43, Exhibit 5).

Bill Zimmerman seems to indiate that

the Respondent Company, for which he is a Regional Associate
Underwriter, considers cancellation for non-payment of premium is
an "underwriting reason", but not to refuse insurance.
(T-132-133).

The alleged misrepresentation here had to give

rise to a probable rejection of the Apellant's application
only if the Aetna Policy was cancelled for an underwriting
reason.

(Exhibits P-1, P-6, T-83, 84, T-133).

never paid a premium to Aetna.

The Appellant had

(T-167, T-33, Exhibit P-5).

Linda Messerly and Exhibit P-5 both indicate that all
correspondence was mailed to the Appellant at 422 South Twelth
East, Apartment 19, in Salt Lake City, Utah, (T-32,33, Exhibit PS).

The Appellant testified that he lived at that address,

Apartment 9 (T-149, T-163) and the deposition of Oslowski indicated the loss took place at Apartment 9 of that address.
(T-146, Exhibit P-5).
The appellant only received one item, the binder from Aetna,
mailed to the wrong address. (T-163 to 166).

Aetna correctly

addressed the releases and the checks for his claim.

(Exhibit

- 3 -
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P-5, T-163).

Therefore the record would indicate no notice of

cancellation was effectively mailed to the Appellant.

He stated

his first written notice of cancellation was when he was preparing for a deposition with the Respondent. (T-164).

Even then

the only cancellation information was for the policy itself and
not the valuable items rider, which was unexplained at court.
(T-39, 145, 193, 194).
The Appellant maintained at trial he had informed the agent
for Respondent of the dimensions of the prior loss (T-177, 181,
T 183-189, 193-196,16) and the mixed nature of this cancellation.
The only information he would have had was an oral notice, not
binding at all, from Oslowski, Aetnas Adjuster.

(T-167, 168, 13,

14,). The Prudential Agent denied receiving information on the
loss or the Aetna history. (T55-62).
After the Respondent bound coverage for the Appellant on his
premises, the Appellant suffered a loss as a result of a fire on
the premises.

One or two days after the fire, October 20, 1976,

Appellant sought recovery under the terms of his policy.

The

Respondent sought this action for a Declaratory Judgment Rescindin:
the Insurance Contract with Prudential based on alleged misrepre·
sentations provided on the application by the Appellant regarding
his history with Aetna.

The trial court found for the Respondent

and the Appellant appeals.
The Appellant is an Iranian Citizen who has English language
difficulties (T-17, 169-170.

- 4 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FROM WHICH THE COURT
COULD INFER THAT THERE WAS ANY INTENTIONAL OR WILLFUL
MISREPRESENTATION MADE ON THE APPLICATION TO PRUDENTIAL
INSURANCE COMPANY OR THAT ANY MISREPRESENTATION WAS MATERIAL
TO THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE RISK OR TO THE HAZARD ASSUMED.
Section 31-19-8 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) states
as follows:
1.

All statements and descriptions in any application
for an insurance policy or annuity contract, or for
the reinstatement or renewal thereof, by or in
behalf of the insured or annuitant, shall be deemed
to be representations and not warranties.
Misrepresentations, omissions, concealment of facts,
and incorrect statements shall not prevent a recovery under the policy or contract unless:
a.

fraudulent; or

b.

material either to the acceptance of the risk,
or to the hazard assumed by the insurer; or

c.

the insurer in good faith either would not
have issued the policy or contract, or would
not have issued reinstated or renewed it
as the same premium rate, or would not have
issued, reinstated or renewed a policy or
contract in as large an amount, or would not
have provided coverage with respect to the
hazard resulting in the loss, if the true
facts had been made known to the insurer as
required either by the appli~ation for the
policy or contract or otherwise.

While the language does not specify that the misrepresentation, omission or concealing of facts must be willful, with
the intent to deceive, the contract of insurance does.
Furthermore, case law in Utah construing that Section of the
statute also requires an willful act done with the intent to
deceive.
In Wootton v. Combined Insurance Company of America
- 5 -
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724 (1964) at Page 725, the Court said:
Unless the misrepresentations in the
negotiation for an insurance policy are
made with the intent to deceive and
"materially affect either the acceptance
of the risk or the hazard assumed by the
insurer" The insurance contract cannot
be avoided by an insurance company. Mere
falsity of answers to questions propounded
are insufficient if not knowingly made
with the intent to deceive and defraud.
Likewise, are the cases of Marks v. Continental Casualty co.,
427 P.2d 387 (Utah 1967) and Burnham v. Banker's Life and Casualty
470 P.2d 261 (Utah,

).

The Appellant here testified at trial that not only did he
not make any misrepresentations willfully, he made none at all.
Even if the court concluded he made misrepresentations, there was
not sufficient evidence before it to infer an intent to
deceive.

The Apppellant stated he gave the agent for Respondent

all the information he had available including having had prior
insurance and a burglary.
the application.

The burglary was listed on Exhibit 5,

Respondent's witness, Bill Zinnnerman, testified

the agent was deficient in not listing the items lost by the
prior burglary on the new application. (T-135, 136).

There was

no reason not to conclude that other information was likewise
omitted through agent error.
More importantly, however, is the point that the Appellant
could only provide information regarding his prior coverage to
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the extent that he was aware of it.

If he was not informed of

the cancellation of the Aetna Policy, then no inference may be drawn
that he intended to keep the information from Prudential.
Again, the Appellant testified he had nothing more than a
vague rumor from Martin Oslowski, an adjuster for Aetna, that his
policy was cancelled.

He didn't receive actual notice tmtil pre-

paring for the claim which resulted in this action, after he had
signed the application for the coverage at issue here.
The District Court erred in assuming he had notice of the
cancellation.

The purported oral statement was from a man who

did not have the power to cancel insurance with Aetna or did he
know the reason the insurance had been cancelled.

For example,

was the insurance cancelled for non-payment of premium? (Tl44,
145, 198, 199).

Linda Messerly, the person who sold the Aetna

policy also gave no testimony regarding the reason for the cancellation.

Apparently while not discussed, the court accepted

the dubious evidence of mailing of the cancellation notice.

No

witness could testify that the notice was, in fact, placed in a
mailbox. But even if we assume that, the notice was clearly sent
to the wrong address.

The notice of cancellation, as the copy in

Exhibit 5 shows it was sent to 422 South Twelth East, apartment
19.

The Appellant testified that there is only 12 apartments at

422 south Twelth East and that he lived in apartment 9.

In the

case of Walker Bank and Trust Company v. First Security
Corporation, 341 P.2d 944 (Utah, 1959) at Page 945,
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the court stated:
"There is, of course, no presumption that a
letter, even though mailed in regular course
was received by her when it was not addressed
where she was living."
In that case the notice of cancellation of an insurance
polciy was mailed to a person in Texas when she lived in Salt
Lake City, Utah.

But the rule is the same if it's next door or

across the Country.

Here the unrebuttable testimony was that the

appellant did not recieve notice of cancellation from Aetna or
its' agents and there is no competent evidence to the contrary.
Consequently, the Appellant was not shown to have made any
misrepresentations to the agent of Respondent, if there was a
misrepresentation made at all. Furthermore, if there is no
showing the appellant had not burden to prove lack of that there
was a misrepresentation, the Appellant had no burden to prove lack,:
intent.

But, again, he testified that he had no such intent. A

burden foisted upon him through the utilization of assumptions
not supported by evidence or law.
There was insufficient evidence of intent to decieve or
defraud.

There was no showing that the appellant knew that a

prior burglary would affect his insurability for a future loss
from a fire.

The previously cited cases all deal with issues

surrounding health or life insurance policies.

The questions all

involved representations or misrepresentations regarding the
health of the insured.

There was no competent evidence at our

trial to indicate that the appellant would not have been insured
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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if the true facts had been known, only that no binder would have
been issued.

An inquiry form could have been submitted to

Prudential for their consideration. (T-100).
Bill Zimmerman testified that the only event proved at trial,
i.e. a loss in excess of $8,000.00, would not have prevented the
Agent from binding the insurance (T-118).

He said if connected

with a prior cancellation, there could be no binding power in the
agent. (T-118, 122).

We have shown there was no evidence pre-

sented at trial to show the Appellant had knowlege of a
cancellation.
Both Bill Zirrnnerman and Lloyd Ferguson stated that if nonpayment of a premium was the reason for the cancellation, Mr.
Ferguson could have bound coverage, as he did, for the Appellant.
The record is devoid of the basis for the cancellation.
Consequently there was no showing that a misrepresentation, if
any, was:
a.

material either to the acceptance of the risk, or to
the hazard assumed by the insurer; or

b.

the insurer in good faith either would not have
issued the policy, or contract, or would not have
issued reinstated or renewed it at the same premium
rate, ;r would not have issued, reinstated, or renewed a policy or contract in as large an amount,
or would not have provided coverage with respect to
the hazard resulting in the loss, if the true facts
have been made known to the insurer as required
either by the application for the policy or contract
or otherwise.
31-19-8 (l)(b),(c)
Utah Code Annotated (1953).
- 9 -
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This case should be reversed and remanded to the District
Court with instruction to enter judgment in favor of the
Appellant.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT REFUSED TO APPLY AN INDUSTRY STANDARD IN
DETERMINING THE MATERIALITY OF ANY MISREPRESENTATIONS.
Appellant sought and the Respondent proffered evidence on the
Industry Standard- on the issue of materiality.

In other words is

the requirement of "Materiality" to be determined from the particu:
Insurance Company's good faith interpretations or on a broader,
more objective standard.

The District Court chose the more

narrow standard. (T-107, 108, 119, 120, 141, 142, 147).
In Burnham v. Bankers Life and Casualty Company 470 P.2d 261
(Utah) this court spelled out the standard by which the
materiality of a misstatement is to be measured.
They said:
First, unless the misrepresentations
in the negotiation for an insurance polciy
are made with intent to deceive and
materially affect either the acceptance
of the risk or the hazard assumed by
the insurer, the insurance contract
cannot be avoided by an insurance
company. Mere falsity of answers to
questions propounded are insufficient
if not knowingly made with intent
to deceive and defraud. Second, whether
or not a misstatement in an application
is material to the risk, while i t is
- 10 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

for the jury t? determine, depends not
upon what the insurer or the insured
~ay think about materiality or the
importance of the false information
given or the true information withheld
but upon what those engaged in the
'
insurance busines, acting reasonably
and naturally in accordance with the
usual practice among insurance companies
under such circumstances, would have done
had they known the truth: that is, whether
reasonably careful and intelligent men
would have regarded the facts stated as substantially increasing the chances of the
happening of the event insured against so
as to cause a rejection of the application.
id. at P. 263
The only evidence tendered on this point was the testimony of
Bill Zimmerman, a Regional office of the Respondent Company.

He

testified he had worked for two prior insurance companies and had
been an underwriter at a company level for nine and a half years
(T-113-115).

He was with one company only a few months.

The

rest of his knowledge of Industry Standards came by rather informal means. e.g. an occasisional review of a competitior's policy
(T-121), discussion at conventions (T-129), and gossip in
general. (T-130)
Those qualifications certainly did not give adequate foundation to qualify Mr. Zimmerman as an expert witness on the
Industry Standard as to what representations are material.
insurance companies do not adquately represent the Myriad of
Insurance companies doing business in Utah.
- 11 -
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Three

Even According to the Respondent's position in this matter
l

that is, where the terms forbidding misrepresentation are a pan
of the application or policy, the company's rules prevail, the
issue of materiality is not covered.

Because of the flexibilicy

needed, what is material and what isn't becomes subjective to a
large degree.

The decision will almost always arise after a loss,

The issuing Company has a bias that may be reflected in the
determination of whether a past representation is material or
not.

To save an immediate payment, they are likely to stretch

the issue of materiality as far as is necessary.

Where they have

controlled the terms of the contract up to the point, there
should be a more objective way of protecting an insured who has
made misrepresentations, willfully or not.

The grounds upon whid

a misrepresentation may be used to void a policy may be set, consistent with Utah Law, by the issuing company.

But a more

objective standard is necessary to determine whether a statement
is material.

Only then can the purchasing public be assured of

fair treatment over issues that cannot be bargained or shopped
for.

The issue of material misrepresentations will only arise

when the claim is sought to be paid.
The case should be reversed and remanded with instructions to
either judgment for the Appellant or, in th alternative, ordering
a new trial to be consistent with the law in Utah.
- 12 -
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CONCLUSION
The lower court failed to apply the proper standard in determining the materiality of any misrepresentations on the application for insurance.

Had the court applied the proper rule of

law, the Respondent did not present sufficient evidence on the
Industry Standard to show that any misrepresentation was
material.
If any event, the evidence was insufficient to show an intentional misrepresentation and the court erred in assuming the
Appellant was sufficiently informed to make a material misrepresentation on the issue of past insurance coverage.

- 13 -
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